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Abstract: The 2012 English Health and Social Care Act marked a fundamental 
reform of statutory healthcare in England in ways which elevated the interests of 
the government over the interests of patients or the professions, and which 
undermined traditional alliances between professions and patients. Drawing on a 
countervailing powers framework we present a thematic analysis of 
parliamentary papers, press releases and other publicly available materials 
produced across the reform process by four key actors in the healthcare field – 
the government, medical profession, patients and ‘for profit’ providers. This 
analysis explores how the pursuit of sectional interests by these actors may have 
acted to constrain potential alliances and ultimately contributed to the enactment 
of the legislation by default. This conclusion has relevance for other Beveridge 
model healthcare systems undergoing health and social care reform under the 
auspices of austerity. 
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Introduction 
Drawing on a countervailing power framework and the notion of a buyers’ revolt 
(Light, 1988, 1998, 2000, 2010) we analyse government-led reforms 
(culminating in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act) of the so-called Beveridge 
model English National Health Service (NHS). This is a system predicated on 
universal access, and based on a single-payer model funded through national 
taxation. The reform of this provision marked a fundamental shift in how the 
English NHS was delivered, through the introduction of mixed funding models in 
that ‘for-profit’ non-statutory providers now had much more opportunity to 
deliver statutory healthcare. This marked a significant change in the expectations 
around provision and promotion of healthcare between citizens and governments, 
in ways which, it could be argued, negatively impact upon citizens. In this paper 
we present a socio-historical analysis of the process of political reform.  Drawing 
on a countervailing powers framework we present an analysis which 
demonstrates how a revolt by payers – the government - facilitated this 
programme of reform. It accomplished this without provoking a crisis of 
legitimacy, despite many critical voices both inside and outside the medical 
profession (Davis and Tallis, 2013, Exworthy et al., 2016). This was achieved 
through a series of countervailing moves which fostered alliances with key 
groups, and blocked other key possible alliances. Our emphasis is on how 
different strategies and rhetorics were deployed to frame the debate and obviate 
any crisis.  
 
Background to the Reforms: 2012 Health and Social Care Act 
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Publicly-funded Beveridge model systems are notoriously difficult to reform, 
firstly, because of their single-payer taxation-based status (fostering the idea of a 
compact between government and tax payers to provide healthcare) and, 
secondly, because of this compact, publicly-financed health services tend to be 
regarded as collectively owned by the population they serve. Any reforms that 
seek to limit or constrain healthcare or reduce the role of the government in 
providing healthcare might be construed as breaking a consensus between 
government and their public, (Powell and Hewitt, 1998). 
 
The reforms contained in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act were not in 
themselves new or novel. They were the culmination of a long series of processes 
initiated by the Conservative government in the 1980’s and subsequently pursued 
by successive Conservative and Labour governments (Mohan, 2009). In 2010, 
the UK Coalition government published a White Paper setting out the tenets of 
its NHS reforms, which had implications both for healthcare providers and the 
continuing role of the single-payer state.  
 
The proposed reforms affected both commissioners and providers, suggesting 
fundamental changes to who could provide NHS services; changes which would 
significantly impact upon the ailing but prevailing NHS provider monopoly in 
England. New mixed funding models created opportunities for voluntary sectori 
and for-profit providers to be commissioned to deliver statutory healthcare 
(Black, 2010, Roland and Rosen, 2011). These were to be achieved through a 
legislative shift from a statutory obligation ‘to provide or secure a comprehensive 
health service’ to a statutory ‘duty to promote a comprehensive health service’ 
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(Pollock and Price, 2011) (italics added); shifting the obligation for providing or 
commissioning services away from the government (i.e. the Department of 
Health) and towards the newly established Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs), while simultaneously ensuring all healthcare providers (for-profit, 
voluntary or NHS), were placed in direct competition against each other through 
Any Qualified Provider mechanisms (Long and McLean, 2011). These processes 
are consistent with a buyers’ revolt as characterised by Timmermans and Kolker 
(2004), creating interdependent yet distinct groups of professions splintered 
across occupational, financial, organisational, technological and governmental 
arenas. These changes re-stratify relationships across all healthcare actors. For 
example, by making CCGs healthcare purchasers, the responsibility for 
providing a population-level health system now rests with them, creating the 
possibility for any shortfall in provision to be attributed to bad local management 
rather than bad central government. Such changes can be broadly characterised 
as a buyers’ revolt (Light, 2010) and the analysis that follows demonstrates how 
this development facilitated this programme of reform without provoking a crisis 
of legitimacy. 
 
What is novel about our analysis is that it demonstrates how these reforms were  
accomplished. It shows how government worked to obviate possible alliances 
between actors who might have successfully  opposed the legislation. This 
strategy is a documented feature of the buyers’ revolt (Timmermans and Kolker, 
2004), whereby the governments’ strongly articulated buyers’ revolt successfully 
created alliances with patient and private sector actors, whilst simultaneously 
undermining the possibility of alliances within and between the medical 
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groupings. We outline the theoretical context of countervailing powers and the 
buyers’ revolt next before presenting our analysis. 
 
Countervailing Powers and Buyers’ Revolt 
Countervailing powers offers a theoretical context that challenges traditional 
notions of professional dominance. It is an attempt to offer a means of tracing the 
strategies and tactics of different groups’ attempts to assert dominance over other 
groups. As such it becomes possible to delineate changing periods and processes 
of dominance by different actors (e.g. single payers, professionals, medical 
industrial complex or publics).  It provides a comprehensive and dynamic 
framework that ‘can tell us far more than that the medical profession continues to 
be dominant’ (Light, 1991a, 1991b). It offers a way of analysing ‘social, 
economic and political behaviours in a field that is dynamically reshaped over 
time’ (Light, 2014, p. 325), by illuminating the ways that (all) countervailing 
powers ‘construct reality and manipulate symbols to portray their situation 
favourably and obtain gains’. For example, Vinson, (2016) draws from 
countervailing powers theory to elaborate the idea of constrained collaboration 
between physicians and patients as a way  of understanding how the profession 
countervails patient empowerment. 
 
In applying countervailing powers to the 2012 reforms we identify an important 
explicatory context offered by Light’s (1988) notion of the buyers’ revolt – 
characterised as a shift towards health employers and government rearticulating 
themselves as ‘aggressive commissioning experts’ (Light 1998). In the US 
context, this led to the development of selective forms of contracting where the 
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key decision makers were the payers rather than the providers. These moves 
towards a dominant commissioning focus were an evident part of the reforms, 
with the creation of Clinical Commissioning Groups, comprised of GPs but 
constrained by devolved budgets. The notion of a revolt describes a series of 
concerted actions, in this case on the part of government and usually formulated 
around tropes of funding and accountability, intended to undermine professional 
dominance. Typically, this is accomplished by pushing power and control 
towards a single-payer, whereby the primacy of government as ‘active buyer’ 
(rather than provider) is emphasised. Consequently, government, businesses and 
the public are constructed as actors who should both demand and expect 
‘accountability and good value’ (Light, 2010) for services purchased from the 
healthcare profession (the transactional basis of this move is self-evident). 
 
Furthermore, the buyers’ revolt is also based on a commitment to reducing levels 
of statutory expenditure and involvement (Light, 2011). Central to the idea of 
single-payer systems is their tax-based structure (Roland and Rosen, 2011). In 
Beveridge model systems this tends to entail instituting new practices around 
financial and clinical accountability, commissioning and patient-centredness 
(DH, 2010). These concerted actions can be manifested through sustained efforts 
to undermine the autonomy and self-regulation that the profession previously 
enjoyed. In the UK, from self-employed GPs through to state employed hospital 
doctors, there is a well-established tradition of autonomy and self-regulation 
(Salter, 2004). The 2012 reforms, structured around new modes of 
commissioning and regulation (AUTHORS), and increased emphases on patient-
centredness and changing professional relations (DH, 2010), attempted to change 
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those traditions. In a countervailing powers context, Hartley (2002) shows how 
the imposition of new regulatory regimes work to undermine physician 
professional dominance by creating new relations or systems of alignment 
between different actors. Similarly, Light (1997) notes that a key issue in the 
1991 NHS market (which he characterises as a failed buyers’ revolt) was that the 
UK Secretary of State remained legally responsible for everything that happened 
in the NHS. This ‘makes him (sic) the chief executive and manager of provision 
and thus completely hog-tied as a purchaser’ (p. 220). This arrangement was 
markedly not the case in the 2012 reforms, where the Secretary of State’s 
obligation is explicitly identified as one of promotion rather than the previously 
problematic notion of provision. 
 
In this context, the 2012 Health and Social Care Act can be regarded as an 
attempt to reduce the reliance of the single-payer (government) on the medical 
profession (as monopoly provider) to meet public expectations around the 
availability of free universal healthcare. In this paper we explore the ways in 
which the concept of a buyers’ revolt might usefully be applied to characterise 
and explain the political success of a series of reforms. This has broader 
implications for other welfare regimes undergoing similar processes of reform.  
 
Data and Methods 
We identify three periods in the legislative process. These are: January 2011 
(marking the formal introduction of the legislation to the state legislature); June 
2011 (marking a temporary halt to the legislative process); and January 2012 
(marking when the legislation was enacted). Within each period we collated 
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publicly available published materials from parliamentary papers, press releases 
and other media statements about the legislation issued by the four key groups: 
the government; the medical profession; patients; and ‘for-profit’ providers. 
These documents were identified by tracking the press releases issued by each of 
the organisations.  
 
There were two inclusion criteria: press releases had to relate to the Health and 
Social Care Act, and to at least one of the three government priorities stated in 
the 2010 White Paper: i.e. 1) new forms of accountability; 2) principles of 
patient-centredness; and 3) innovative and new ways of working that empowered 
professionals. We defined ‘new forms of accountability’ as text related to new 
metrics, based around evidence based medicine, clinical outcome measures, 
patient outcome measures and patient experience data (DH, 2010). ‘Patient- 
centredness’ referred to appeals to a patient led, patient-driven service, 
characterised by shared decision-making that championed patient and public 
involvement in order to ‘put patients and public first’, (DH, 2010, p.12). 
‘Innovative and new ways of working as empowered professionals’ were 
captured through rhetorics of ‘autonomy, accountability and democratic 
legitimacy’, (DH, 2010, p.12). These were predicated on the introduction of 
effective (and competitive) commissioning processes via the creation of Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (for a more detailed discussion of these government 
criteria see AUTHORS). 
 
For the government, we considered a range of Department of Health (DH) 
documents, parliamentary papers and press releases. For the medical profession 
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we focused on professional associations e.g. the Royal Colleges belonging to the 
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, as other groupings such as the British 
Medical Association. For patient organisations, we focused on the Patients 
Association, a national patient charity, independent from government, with over 
50 years standing in the field. While not a representative body, it was a vocal and 
identifiable media presence throughout the reform process. We did not consider 
national campaigning organisations, as, whilst they were vocal, they were not 
solely concerned with campaigns about the provision of healthcare. In terms of 
‘for-profit’ providers, we chose the NHS Partners Network and the NHS 
Confederation. At the time of the reforms, the NHS Partners Network 
represented the interests of twenty-four non-statutory providers, including 
Alliance Medical, BUPA UK, Care UK, Capita, Optum, Maximus, and Virgin 
Care. The NHS Confederation is the membership body for all organisations that 
commission and provide NHS services, across hospital trusts, ambulance trusts, 
Clinical Commissioning Groups, foundation trusts, and independent and 
voluntary sector healthcare organisations.  We completed a thematic analysis 
across the four constituent groups (over 100 press releases and reports 
specifically related to the healthcare reforms).  
 
There was some imbalance across the published materials, in that the patient 
groups and ‘for-profit’ provider groups tended to talk to singular aspects of the 
legislation (such as patient centredness or new ways of working) whereas 
government and the profession published materials about all three components. 
As such there were more documents from the government and the profession 
included in the analysis. We do not propose an exhaustive analysis of each of the 
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groups. Rather we are concerned with the public face of these organisations, and 
how a buyers’ revolt framework might help us make sense of what they were 
trying to accomplish in the ways that they positioned themselves, against other 
actors. It also needs to be recognised that the public face presented in published 
material should not be seen as being representative of the views of everyone 
within each organisation. They are simply the views that were publicly 
expressed, and which are taken to represent the ways of talking about the reforms 
that were publicly available for the actors we identified. In this sense they are 
limited in terms of how representative they may be of the particular groups, but 
they are taken to be indicative of the dominant framings of public and 
professional discourse about the reforms. Most of these data are taken from 
online materials, meaning it is not always possible to assign a page number to the 
quotations.  
 
The specific examples presented in this paper are indicative of the broader 
analysis of this data set. We considered the three themes in terms of their 
standalone presence across the materials and for the ways they were invoked in 
wider discussions. Coding was completed independently by the two authors and 
then comparative analysis ensured consensus across the identification and 
categorisation of themes. We present the analysis chronologically. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Period One: January 2011 Introduction of the Legislation 
 
	 11	
The Government 
The publication of the Health and Social Care Bill (2011) was accompanied by a 
press release from the Department of Health entitled ‘Patient-centred NHS a step 
closer to reality’, (Department of Health, 2011) in which all of the key proposals 
were centred around themes of accountability, patient-centredness and new ways 
of working that empowered professionals. These included how the legislation 
would ‘bring commissioning closer to patients by giving responsibility to GP-led 
groups’ (combining a theme of patient-centred localism e.g. through the patient 
being closer to the commissioning process, combined with empowered 
professionals, who would be given more responsibility); how the legislation 
would ‘increase accountability for patients and the public by establishing 
HealthWatch and local Health and Wellbeing Boards within local councils’, (in 
the UK, a council is the elected administrative body governing a local area). In 
this example, issues of accountability are coupled to local developments in 
patient-centredness. HealthWatch were tasked with providing a patient and 
public involvement focus, with a statutory role in advocating for the needs and 
concerns of people who used health and social care services. Health and 
Wellbeing Boards were organised between local authorities and healthcare 
providers, with the aim of improving integration of local health care, social care, 
public health and related public services (Davies et al., 2014) – both bodies 
represent an intended shift which would ‘liberate the NHS from political micro-
management by supporting all trusts to become foundation trusts’ and ‘reduce 
bureaucracy by streamlining arm’s-length bodies’ (raising issues of 
accountability, new ways of working and value for money through a promise of 
reduced bureaucracy). It continued: ‘the NHS would be more focused on results 
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that are meaningful to patients by measuring outcomes such as how successful 
their treatment was and their quality of life, not just processes like waiting list 
targets’ (examples of accountability, new frameworks and patient-centredness). 
Furthermore it asserts that bureaucracy would be reduced as ‘clinicians would 
lead the way – GP-led groups will commission services based on what they 
consider their local patients’ need, not on what managers feel the NHS can 
provide’ (themes of accountability and of new ways of working). In turn ‘there 
will be real democratic legitimacy, with local councils and clinicians coming 
together to shape local services’ and ‘they will allow the best people to deliver 
the best care for patients – with those on the front-line in control, not Ministers or 
bureaucrats’ (a combination of new frameworks, patient-centredness and new 
ways of working). Patient-centredness was identified as the number one priority, 
to be accomplished through processes that democratised healthcare provision, 
and reduced levels of direct government (and management), all achieved through 
a restatement of clinical priorities based on ‘what patients need’. The rhetoric of 
patient-centred care works in the interest of the government because of its 
ambiguity, i.e. it means different things to different actors. It stakes a claim for 
the moral high ground and requires those different actors to invest in it without 
resolving inherent contradictions between what the government might claim is 
patient-centred and what patients or the profession might think. For the 
profession, it is impossible not to commit to the idea of patient-centred care. This 
brings us to consider the response of the profession. 
 
The Medical Profession 
There were two main responses to the Bill across the profession: a broad 
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welcome and critical engagement. To stand against the reforms at this early stage 
would have been politically inept. The Royal Colleges collectively offered a 
broad welcome, whereby they ‘made clear…support for the principle of the 
Government’s health service reforms, with the emphasis on quality outcomes and 
the greater engagement of clinicians’, (Academy Medical Royal Colleges, 2011) 
(speaking to new metrics of accountability, but ignoring patient-centredness). 
The Royal College of General Practitioners, (RCGP, 2011) gave a guarded 
endorsement of patient-centred localism, calling for ‘a much fairer balance 
between the rights of the individual and the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
NHS as a whole, as well as taking the broader needs of society into account’. 
This response identified positive impacts in terms of patient-centredness and 
good value, and contrasted them with an implied negative impact upon the 
principle of universal health provision. In a similar vein, the British Medical 
Association (2011a, 2011b, 2011c) supported greater involvement of clinicians 
in ‘planning and shaping NHS services’ (professional empowerment) but 
described the reforms as a ‘massive gamble’, arguing possible gains were 
threatened by forced competition (challenging proposed new ways of working). 
 
There was no concerted countermove against the reforms across the medical 
groupings. Objections tended more towards reflecting sectional interests rather 
than a move to protect the principle of universal care. 
 
The Patients 
Patient groups were broadly welcoming, suggesting the rhetoric around a patient-
centred NHS was effective, echoing the centrality of patient involvement in any 
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buyers’ revolt. Simultaneously, the Patients Association did voice concerns about 
ensuring clinical decisions were made in the patients’ best interest rather than 
‘what is best for the consortium’s bank balance,’ (Patients Association, 2011). 
This combination raised positive endorsement of changes to accountability, 
whilst also demonstrating a mistrust of the profession and a reticence towards 
empowered professionals, seen as operating in their own interest rather than the 
patients. This highlights the utility of a split between the government as promoter 
and the clinical commissioning groups as provider, as the Patients Association 
targeted the (frontline) profession with their opprobrium, not the (backgrounded) 
government.  
 
The Patients Association statement revealed their respective sectional interest. In 
accepting the idea of patient-centredness, they (wittingly or unwittingly) 
supported the countervailing move of single-actor dominance on the part of the 
government. This move worked to align government and patient interests and to 
increase mistrust between patients and professionals.  
 
‘For-Profit’ Providers 
The NHS Confederation published a pro-reform document two days prior to the 
publication of the Bill. The document detailed ‘12 points for policy-makers to 
bear in mind to minimise the risks associated with moving to a new system’ 
(NHS Confederation, 2011, p. 16) and called for direct dialogue between 
government and the private sector. Notable amongst the 12 points are the need to 
‘create a compelling narrative about why the reforms matter in order to engage 
patients, the public and staff in the enterprise’ (ibid.), (again aligning the private 
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sector with the reforming government and perhaps indicating that the utility of 
patient-centredness was principally as a compelling narrative); the need to 
‘ensure hospitals operating in a market-based system can reconfigure services 
and organise multi-faceted specialist care’ ; and a statement that policy-makers 
can only ‘recognise the benefits of the market in terms of improving quality and 
efficiency by creating space for new entrants,’ (again, echoing the need for ‘real’ 
competition and for the government to respond to the needs of the private sector). 
It explicitly asserted that ‘this will not happen naturally when, as in the case of 
the NHS, the size of total markets is not increasing. Closure of existing services 
will be necessary’; this appears to suggest closure of existing NHS provision to 
create ‘parity’ of opportunity for non-NHS providers. By seeking parity of access 
to existing markets the Confederation is working to countervail the perceived 
dominance of embedded NHS medical professionals. This is clearly a 
development of Light’s (1997) notion of ‘dictated competition’. 
 
In summary, over this first period, initial moves by government provoked a series 
of either holding or supporting moves from other actors in the field. Private 
providers wholeheartedly supported the reforms. Patients were drawn into a 
difficult, perhaps contradictory position – with an obvious appeal of patient-
centred care, but coupled to a concern around decreasing levels of healthcare 
spending. The profession offered a holding position, which kept them ‘in the 
game’. There were clear alliances between government and patient organisations 
and government and private providers, whilst the profession was largely non-
aligned with any other actors in terms of the way the countervailing moves 
played out.  
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Period Two: June 2011- A Temporary Halt 
It was in this second period that misgivings about the reforms across the 
profession, patients and private providers provoked a response from government. 
It decided to temporarily halt the legislative process in April 2011, in what was 
described as a national ‘listening exercise’, intended to address concerns about 
the legislation. In June 2011 a broad-ranging group of health and social care 
professionals (the so-called Future Forum) was convened. This halt could 
represent a government response to effective countervailing moves on the part of 
opponents to the legislation (i.e. some professional groups and some patients), 
many of whom had publicly raised concerns about the legislation. However, the 
details of this pressure are not sufficiently recorded in the public domain. We 
take the four key published criteria that arose from the listening exercise as 
indicative evidence of manoeuvring, and regard them as the elements that the 
government had to be seen to be addressing in order to assuage the profession 
and patient groups. These elements were responses to questions around: 1) 
‘choice and competition in relation to improving quality’; 2) ‘ensuring public 
accountability and patient involvement’; 3) ‘providing new arrangements for 
education and training’; and 4) ‘involving a range of healthcare professions in 
advising on improving patient care’ (Field, 2011). Once again, this ‘national 
listening exercise’ was couched in appeals to patient-centredness and citizen 
engagement, except for point three which suggests a degree of deal-making 
between government and some elements of the profession to provide a protected 
status for training and education.  
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Overall, the pause can be seen to represent a reassertion by government of the 
necessity of the reform program, couched around narratives of legitimacy and 
democratic engagement across publics, patients and the profession.  
 
The Government 
The Future Forum was tasked by the government with co-ordinating a series of 
listening events for professions, patients and the public to address concerns about 
the legislation. Membership of the Forum was by invitation (from government) 
and comprised forty-four members across four groupings; non-statutory groups, 
local authorities, healthcare professions, and higher education providers. The 
largest grouping was healthcare professionals, comprising twenty-six of the 
forty-four members, with representatives from chief executive officers of NHS 
trusts, GPs, surgeons and professional associations. Of the forty-four members, 
only three were ‘on record’ as having critically engaged with the legislation and 
none as having opposed it. 
 
The Future Forum made a number of key recommendations; the GP 
Commissioning Consortia were rebadged Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs) and the GP-centric focus was reduced through inclusion of a minimum 
of two lay-members, alongside a hospital doctor and a nurse (Field, 2011). In 
addition, there was  much more explicit oversight of CCGs in terms of 
engagement with patients, HealthWatch, clinical senates, and Health and 
Wellbeing Boards. Clinical senates were instituted across twelve sites in England 
and comprised of clinicians, patients and other partners. They were tasked with 
providing non-statutory, independent advice to commissioners and other 
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stakeholders about population level healthcare decisions (perhaps indicative of a 
reassertion of population-level provision of healthcare, against a prevailing drive 
towards localism). Underlying these apparent concessions were a broad range of 
appeals to the purported democratic legitimacy that patient and public 
involvement focused activities lent the reforms. These were coupled with 
measures aimed at assuaging professional concerns; e.g. the incorporation of 
secondary-care professions (and patients) into the governance arrangements for 
CCGs. 
 
The Medical Profession 
For the profession, a spirit of critical engagement prevailed during this period. 
The Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP, 2011a) stated that:  
 
‘We are reassured that things are moving in the right direction; the 
emphasis on preserving the principles of the NHS and keeping it free 
at the point of need; freeing the NHS from political interference; 
clinical commissioning of local services; and the real focus on 
reducing health inequalities are to be welcomed. However, we still 
have a number of outstanding concerns about the potential risks and 
unexpected consequences of the proposals. We need the Government 
to reassure us that GPs will be given the freedom and autonomy to 
lead the decision-making and design of future integrated health 
systems drawing on the support of other health, social care and third 
sector services. We support clinician-led commissioning but continue 
to believe that GPs are best placed to lead this process.’ 
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This extract demonstrates a strong emphasis on sectional interests, though there 
was also a direct reference to preserving principles of free care based on need, 
coupled with a strong endorsement of the ‘spirit’ of the reforms. There is no 
direct mention of patients. The British Medical Association briefing (BMA, 
2011a) also welcomed the Forum report stating: ‘The…recommendations 
address many of the British Medical Association’s key concerns…We are 
hopeful that our “missing” concerns, such as the excessive power of the NHS 
Commissioning Board over consortia…will be addressed’. This response speaks 
clearly to their sectional interests, endorsing them whilst offering a clear 
statement of concern over external influence on clinical activity.  
 
The Patients 
The Patients Association (PA) submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Public 
Bill Committee Debate in the House of Commons stating:  
 
‘The PA accepts the intention of the Government’s Health and Social Care 
Bill is to put the patient at the heart of the NHS and we support the overall 
principles of a NHS that is led by clinicians with patients at the centre. We 
welcome a reduction in bureaucracy if this frees up funding to be reinvested 
into frontline services. We welcome a focus on patient involvement in 
services, if this is truly representative of all patients.’  
 
‘However, our concerns with the current Bill is that it…needs to be 
delivered against a backdrop of £20 billion savings…Not only do we believe 
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this is a near impossible ask of the NHS but it is in danger of having a 
detrimental effect on patient care and frontline services.’ (Patients 
Association, 2011a). 
 
This statement attempts to de-couple patient-centredness (and the perceived 
gains it brings for the Patients Association) from concerns about funding. For 
them, patient-centredness is good, financial constraint is bad. Rather than 
rejecting the reform program (such is the promise of the post-reform patient-
centred NHS), these concerns are couched in terms of the need for a tempered 
austerity. Financial limitations are viewed as having a negative impact upon 
patients, i.e. as individualised actors, not as components of a larger healthcare 
system, again taking us back to Timmermans and Kolker’s (2004) 
characterisation of a buyers’ revolt. Consider that an alternative formulation of 
this context might be that the adverse impact of financial cuts on staffing levels 
could be even worse in terms of a knock-on effect for patients, regardless of how 
patient-centred their care might be. This alternative does not feature. The 
government seems to secure a buy-in from the patients by appearing to valorise 
those patients’ sectional interests and this buy-in lends expediency and 
legitimacy to the reform process, in turn reasserting the buyers’ revolt. 
 
‘For-Profit’ Providers 
The Future Forum did not include any representatives from the independent 
sector.  Their interests seem to be backgrounded during this period, as the 
government appears to focus on assuaging public and professional concerns 
about the legitimacy of the reforms. During this time for-profit provider concerns 
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tend to revolve around making sure their voice is not lost from the discussions. 
 
In summary, this period appears to mark a successful response by government to 
moves made by various actors against the initial presentation of the Bill. The 
government offers a number of different manifestations of the legislation that 
function to accommodate their key objections. It appears that the profession has 
to an extent protected its sectional interests, resulting in continued endorsement 
of the legislation (notwithstanding their realpolitik need to remain ‘at the table’). 
The patients appear to continue to support the buyers’ revolt and the for-profit 
providers seem to remain concerned about parity of opportunity in terms of 
access to market.  
 
Period Three: January 2012 – Legislation Passed 
 
In this final period the government pressed ahead with the legislative process. It 
was a period of escalating professional resistance, but this opposition was largely 
ineffective.  
 
The Government 
Significant challenges came during the Bill’s passage through the House of 
Lords but the government won out after over two thousand amendments 
(Kmietowicz, 2012) were made to it. These amendments might suggest 
successful countervailing moves, yet the tone and tenor of the reforms were left 
largely unchanged, with the central proposals around accountability, patient-
centredness and empowered professions remaining, and effected through the 
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implementation of the new commissioning criteria.  
 
The Medical Profession 
As of January 2012 a large number, but not a majority, of the Royal Colleges had 
collectively called for the Bill to be withdrawn. By March 2012, sixteen (80%) of 
the Colleges had issued calls for the Bill to be either substantially amended or 
dropped outright (five wanted the Bill dropped, two balloted their membership 
over withdrawing support, and nine took or maintained a line of ‘critical 
engagement’). In addition, the Allied Health Professions Federation called for the 
Bill to be withdrawn, as had the British Medical Association (BMA, 2011a). In 
this time-period, opposition was formulated around more explicit appeals to 
altruism, with the reforms represented as working against the best interests of the 
patient. In calling for the Bill’s complete withdrawal, the Royal College of 
General Practitioners stated ‘…The College remains concerned that the Bill will 
cause irreparable damage to patient care and jeopardise the NHS’ (RCGP, 2012). 
They argued that ‘competition, and the opening up of our health service to any 
qualified providers will lead not only to fragmentation of care, but also 
potentially to a ‘two-tier’ system with access to care defined by a patient’s ability 
to pay’. This rhetoric inverted the operationalisation of patient-centredness the 
government had advocated, stating that it countermanded the very foundation of 
the NHS. In characterising the reforms as the fundamental rejection of the 
principle of free universal healthcare, the Royal College of General Practitioners 
sought to challenge the democratic legitimacy of the legislation, by questioning 
the motives of the single-payer. However, this defence appeared late in the 
process, it was not foregrounded in the initial response to the legislation, where 
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the primary emphasis was on sectional interests.  
 
Conversely other Royal Colleges continued to pursue a policy of ‘critical 
engagement’, which drew on notions of professional altruism. The Colleges 
collectively referred to wanting to work with government to ensure the best 
possible health service for patients (thus utilising patient-centredness but not 
inverting it as the Royal College of General Practitioners had done).  
 
In sum, many of the constituents of the respective Royal Colleges changed their 
view of the reforms when it became apparent to them that the new models of 
professionalism, coupled to new metrics and increased levels of competition, 
were going to impact negatively on their own sectional (and sub-sectional) 
interests. This suggests that professional responses throughout the reform process 
tended to countervail the potential dominance of other medical professional 
groupings (i.e. each other) rather than the government. In this context the 
profession was outplayed by this buyers’ revolt and failed to countervail the 
actions of government.  
 
The Patients 
The Patients Association moved to describe the Bill as ‘misguided, unnecessary 
and unwanted’ (Patients Association, 2012) and identified three key concerns: 
‘external involvement’ in the delivery of care creating excessive competition 
between providers; the creation of ‘GP Commissioning Groups (sic)’ which they 
felt would negatively impact upon the relationship between patients and their 
doctor; and the assessment that legislation did not offer adequate opportunities 
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for patient engagement at a local level (i.e. they were not patient-centred 
enough!). Concerns about marketisation, changing professional relations, and a 
lack of democratic legitimacy spoke directly to central elements of the critique of 
the reforms. They explained their change of position by saying that they had 
these concerns at the outset of the legislative process, but that these had been 
exacerbated through the different ‘incarnations’ of the Bill.  
 
The ‘for-profit’ sector 
At the point of enactment of the Bill the NHS Confederation and the NHS 
Partners Network issued a joint statement in response to an Office of Health 
Economics report on competition in the NHS. They stated that:  
 
NHS Confederation chief executive Mike Farrar said: “We believe 
the NHS should embrace the use of well-managed and intelligent 
competition. Properly regulated competition and integrated care do 
not need to be mutually exclusive. Competition should never be an 
end in itself. Competitive processes need to focus on the 
improvement of services across the system and ensure that poor 
providers of care are stamped out. Competition will be a key 
weapon to help clinical commissioning groups ensure that 
substandard care is never the only option for their patients. 
Regulation is key to competition being a success” (National Health 
Executive, 2012).  
 
David Worskett, director of the NHS Confederation’s NHS 
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Partners Network, added: “This report takes an informed and 
balanced view of the benefits that competition can bring to patients 
and the standards of NHS care they receive. As the authors of this 
report rightly point out, competition does not equate to 
privatisation. Competition is a key means in allowing those 
responsible for public funds to improve patient care, not the threat 
which is sometimes suggested. Having a range of providers in 
healthcare is crucial for promoting innovative treatment and 
spreading best practice. If the NHS turns its back on competition 
now, it may hinder its response to the huge demographic and 
financial challenges it faces in the next 20 years” (ibid.). 
 
In this example appeals to patient-centredness (via parity of access) were 
coupled to the need for integrated care (between health and social care) as 
a means of ensuring the best standard of patient care. This manifestation 
worked as a rallying call for the private sector, beseeching government to 
hold the line against the threat of an unsustainable demographic disaster if 
the reform agenda was not maintained. The utility of a buyers’ revolt is 
self-evident in terms of how it empowered private sector actors to work in 
alliance with a reforming state, and how it backgrounded the marketisation 
of public healthcare through appeals to competition being in the patients’ 
best interest.  
 
In summary, this period marks the conclusion of the state-led buyers’ revolt. The 
profession changed strategy during this time but it appeared to be too little too 
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late. The patients also rather belatedly started to consider alternative modes of 
patient-centredness, whilst the ‘for profit’ providers continued to demand 
competition be placed at the very centre of NHS provision.  
 
Discussion 
We have combined Light’s concept of countervailing powers framework with the 
idea of a buyers’ revolt to provide an analytical lens through which to view the 
processes that facilitated the 2012 reforms of the English NHS. This revolt was 
accomplished through the simultaneous introduction of more market 
opportunities for non-statutory providers, coupled with increased patient-
centredness (purportedly to increase levels of patient satisfaction) and new 
modes of professional regulation. Given the ubiquity of similar tropes around 
these features of healthcare policy across a broad range of western health policy 
contexts, the 2012 reforms provide a useful roadmap for explicating and 
characterising these processes as part of wider moves towards the marketisation 
and privatisation of statutory healthcare.  
 
The countervailing powers approach presents an analytical framework for 
tracking and explaining the processes of reform by highlighting the ways in 
which the government asserted itself in the face of the historical dominance of 
the medical profession. Typically, countervailing powers focusses on the relation 
between patients and the profession (see Beach 2018, Vinson, 2016), but in this 
paper we offer insights into countervailing processes involved in a buyers’ revolt 
from the perspective of a Beveridge state single payer moving against a 
monopoly provider. This approach demonstrates how processes of alliances and 
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vested interests were played out and through these countervailing moves in order 
to accomplish a successful buyers’ revolt, whereby much of the statutory 
responsibility for the provision of healthcare was reduced or even removed. Most 
importantly, this was accomplished without provoking a political crisis of 
legitimacy. This focus on the legitimacy resonates with Sheid’s (2008) assertion 
that buyers revolts mark a movement from a provider to a buyer driven system of 
care.  
 
Measures such as these were combined to ‘splinter and fracture’ the collective 
bargaining position of the medical profession. Intra-sectional interests won out 
over inter-sectional concerns, as the various factions of the medical profession 
failed to unify against the reforms.  
 
Our analysis demonstrates countervailing moves from within different groups of 
actors, rather than across different actors. Typically, countervailing powers 
focuses on moves and counter moves between actors, but our analysis 
demonstrates countervailing moves within the profession. In this context, 
sectional rivalry made collective action against the reforms difficult to establish 
and even harder to maintain. When coupled to vociferous government appeals to 
patient-centredness, (which played out against this purported professional self-
interest) forging any alliances between professions and patients proved difficult. 
The claimed democratic legitimacy of a patient-centred NHS made any concerted 
professional/patient alliance difficult?. It is noteworthy that the Royal College of 
General Practitioners, representing the professionals who stood to gain the most 
at the outset of the reform process, ended up as the most outspoken critic and 
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ultimately sought alliances with patients around concerns about universal 
coverage and access. This would suggest that the RCGP abandoned the pursuit of 
sectional interests from within the reform process and instead sought a more 
public strategy (appealing to patients as end-users) in a bid to undermine the 
patient-centred governmental alliance.  
 
The successful passage of these reforms suggests a prevailing orthodoxy 
predicated on the articulation of a healthcare funding crisis, enacted through the 
development or blocking of particular strategic alliances. It is constituted around 
bottom-line economic arguments of government-invoked austerity, coupled to 
rhetorics of professional distrust and claims for a concomitant democratic shift 
towards patient-centred models of care. The application of ‘value-for money’ 
principles to the issue of healthcare spending, constituted via patient-centredness 
and professional control, functioned as a legitimation device for wholescale 
service reforms. The successful accomplishment of this program was predicated 
on a reduced level of statutory funding and involvement and increased 
competition across an expanding number of non-statutory providers.  It also 
involved new models of professional working intended to constrain autonomous 
professional practice and purchasers and providers tied into new models of 
accountability. The buyers’ revolt clearly was an effective means for government 
to challenge the dominance of the profession, without provoking a crisis of 
political legitimacy. The countervailing powers framework offers a very apposite 
means of interrogating and tracking these changes in the context of neoliberal 
policy regimes in what looks to be the continuing retrenchment of statutory 
healthcare provision.  
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NOTES 
i. Voluntary sector refers to a range of largely non-profit making community 
interest companies, charities and other similar organisations involved in the 
provision of statutory and non-statutory health and social care services.  
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